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Abstract
The article investigates two contemporary propositions that it 
seeks to dismantle: 1. The proposition “everything is political” 
that it takes as one of the crucial implication of the concept of 
biopolitics. 2. The proposition “all art is political” that it takes to 
be a defense mechanism against the insight of the indefensibility 
of proposition 1. The article demonstrates how both propositions 
ultimately unfold from the mythic assumption of a givenness of 
politics and/or art and it concludes by suggesting that only  
a complete suspension of any kind of givenness might be  
a preparation for true politics or art to come. This  
preparation the article delineates  
as fatalist preparation.
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First as “Politics,” then as “Art”
And suddenly in the laborious nowhere, suddenly 
the unsayable spot where the pure Too­little is 
transformed incomprehensibly—leaps around and 
changes into that empty Too­much. 
Rilke, 5thDuino Elegy
We arrange [ordnen] it. It breaks down. We  
rearrange it and we break down ourselves.
Rilke, 8thDuino Elegy
Look, I am alive. Where from? Neither childhood 
nor future grows any smaller... Supernumerary  
being­there rises up in my heart.
Rilke, 9thDuino Elegy
Everything is Political
Not so long ago, one could have still quite easily been led to believe 
that everything is, at least in some sense, political. Not so long ago, one 
might have been tempted to assume that everything may in fact be (po-
tentially) political; once Michel Foucault famously captured this concep-
tion, it seemed certain: “where there is power, there is resistance” (Fou-
cault 1990: 95). And as power permeates all kinds of relations, may they 
be social, artistic, scientific, juridical, or of whatever kind; as “power is 
everywhere… because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1990: 93), re-
sistance and hence politics is also, at least potentially, everywhere, be-
cause it can come from everywhere. Everything is political, as one could 
have believed, because power is everywhere and is always accompanied by 
a politicizing resistance to it. But it also seemed to be precisely their pe-
culiarly weak “dialectical” relationship—any new progress in power pro-
duces resistance to that very power, which again through a process of as-
similation ensures the very progress of power—which makes power, or 
more precisely, power­knowledge relations, so productive. Believing that 
everything is political also implied that there is nothing, no object, no 
 issue, no subject, no entity, no site, which could not at one point become 
a political thing, a political object, a political issue, a political subject, 
a political entity, or political site for that matter.
Yet such a rendering only accounts for the very idea of, at least, the 
potential totalization of politics. This is to say it accounts for the “every-
thing” (object, sites, etc.) in the proposition “everything is political” but 
does not account for what is meant by “politics.” It is again Foucault who 
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in this regard gave a famous and paradigmatic answer: As the power that 
is constantly facing resistance, which it itself produced and struggles to 
re­assimilate, is a power over life, it is defined as biopower and hence the 
politics related to it can therefore be defined as biopolitics. In the follow-
ing I will neither reconstruct the intricacies of Foucault’s own elaboration 
of this concept,1 nor will I address questions whither one can or even 
should trace the historical origin and genesis of this form of politics. I will 
therefore not deal with questions such as: Did biopolitics begin with 
(a misinterpretation of) Aristotle and might one therefore also be able to 
find conceptual resource within Aristotle to counter it, as Giorgio Agam-
ben has it, or is it rather a modern invention that co­emerged with a spe-
cific mode of government and is it linked to concepts like normality, sov-
ereignty, liberty, as Foucault seemed to have argued? I will rather read the 
claim “everything is political” in a categorical way such that it neither 
implies a specific topological nor temporal horizon.
I will thus explore how one can justify the claim that everything is 
political in a conceptual manner. To investigate this justification means 
taking into account a peculiar concatenation of a specific concept of poli-
tics and a specific concept of life. I will demonstrate that it is highly prob-
lematic to assume that everything is political and that this very claim 
manifests an obfuscation, a foreclosure, an obscuration of politics. I will 
argue that the claim that “everything is political” although it explicitly 
seems to speak of politics speaks of politics in a form which prevents, 
hinders, blocks, and obscures politicality. In brief, I will propose that 
“every thing is political” is an apolitical slogan, an ideological slogan that 
embodies a way of speaking of or about politics that actually prevents 
politics proper through the very form of addressing it. To render this idea 
intelligible, one might here think of Hegel’s wonderful saying that for a 
certain position it holds that when it is the most dead, its favorite words 
are “life” and “enliven” (Hegel 2008: 10). Today, I want to argue, one might 
translate this criticism and state the following about the position I will 
subsequently be addressing: When it is the most apolitical, its favorite 
slogan is “everything is political.” In the following I will first clarify this 
point through an investigation of the link between politics and life that 
one can find condensed in the notion of biopolitics (in one of its many 
formulations at least). Thereby I will also, although implicitly, address the 
relation between politics and ideology (in its bad version). Ideology, the 
bad kind, is what can be at least partially characterized by a peculiar pro-
cedure, namely that the very way of explicitly referring to a thing is the 
very means of avoiding it. The very act that makes one seemingly directly 
engage is the very manner to avoid any real engagement—one may just 
recall what happened after the NSA–Snowden scandal: nothing happened 
1  I have done this elsewhere, see Ruda (2011).
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after it was made public, so the very means of revealing a previously unat-
tained knowledge can serve as the very medium to hinder, block its effec-
tivity.2 I will argue that “everything is political” as a way of reading the 
conceptual implication of the term biopolitics can depict not only that the 
former is an ideological slogan in the same sense, it can moreover show 
some fundamental limitations of the latter term. Yet, I will contend that 
one should analyze this very slogan (“everything is political”) in relation 
to another one—and this will be dealt with in the second, much shorter 
part of the present article—namely that all art is political.
The present article is not at all meant polemically but as conceptual 
analysis, which is why I here want to draw on one reconstruction of the 
very foundational move of the concept of biopolitics that was presented 
in a very instructive manner by Roberto Esposito. I here refer to Esposito 
not because I think he is the most authoritative source or the coolest of all 
biopolitics philosophers, but rather because he claims that it is precisely 
the link between life and politics that has to be rethought—and this is 
what also motivates his complex critique of Foucault. This criticism runs 
as follows: Foucault only presented a negative (even if fundamentally 
productive) concept of biopolitics. Against this Esposito seeks to excavate 
another dimension of biopolitics. His main argument may be resumed as 
follows: Since Foucault only saw the productive yet negative dimension 
he foreclosed the possibility to conceive of a different conception of bio-
politics and with it of a concept of politics proper. Because he only con-
ceptualized a negative version of biopolitics, he was unable to truly think 
politics proper. For politics in Foucault’s conception is thereby conceptu-
ally resisting itself, or: it’s being thought and ends up being nothing but a 
negative conception of politics. This is an interesting argument which 
clearly marks the ideological dimension of the claim that everything is 
political that I take to be one possible articulation of the very concept of 
politics that is implied in the concept of biopolitics. Against Foucault, one 
may say, Esposito seeks to split biopolitics into two and thereby open up 
a domain for real politics that overcomes biopolitical totalization; “a poli­
tics of life instead of a politics over life” (Esposito 2012a: 77). But to get to 
this point, one first needs to elaborate Esposito’s reconstruction of the 
conceptual coordinates of what he calls negative biopolitics and also why 
he assumes that it is essentially negative.
Esposito defines politics in this model as “nothing other than the pos-
sibility or the instrument for keeping life alive” (2006: 24). This is why for 
him biopolitics is not only productive, as Foucault famously claimed in his 
History of Sexuality I, but also always entails a moment of negativity that he 
conceptually links to a broader concept, namely the notion of immunity. 
2  This point is one way of reading a part of the argument Alain Badiou deve­
lops (2015).
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At the origin of Esposito’s reconstruction of the (negative) biopolitical no-
tion of politics lies the idea that I can only keep myself alive if I stand in a 
negative relation to all others and hence immunize myself from them. In 
this sense biopolitics implies a conception of politics that keeps life alive 
and is therefore always a politics of separation. And one may infer even 
further that in this context: everything is political if, and only if, every-
where there is separation. But why does this kind of politics rely on separa-
tion? Esposito answers by contending that this is because of the fact that 
any concept of politics necessarily relies on a concept of life, in this case on 
the idea that life is immanently self­destructive. And one can obviously 
think of easy evidence: animals kill other animals, animals eat plants that 
are also somehow alive, humans kill humans, eat animals and plants, etc. 
Esposito’s idea is that the implied concept of life determines the concept of 
politics that one ends up with. No concept of politics without reference to 
the concept of life, yet it is the latter which determines and sets out the 
stakes for the former. The conception of life implied in the notion of bio-
politics is one that takes life to be immanently directed against itself, as 
something that has a self­destructive tendency and therefore needs pro-
tection of itself against itself. For Esposito such a conception of life is at 
work in an amazing series of theoretical positions namely in Hobbes, 
Locke, Hume, Durkheim, Nietzsche, Scheler, Gehlen, Plessner, Parsons, 
Luhmann, Marquard, Weber, and he even refers to Freud and Marx.3
All of them for Esposito conceive of life as something that is imbued 
with a specific kind of self­negating negativity. In short, they all state that 
any form of life has a deadening tendency. Life in living negates itself and 
this is why the preservation of life cannot be performed by life itself. Life 
is sick, ill and dying of itself, or rather life is its own illness and to cure itself 
from itself, for life to survive, something else is needed, something differ-
ent from life. Life’s other, an other which thrives on life, operates on it and 
saves it, is politics. Politics is thereby defined as a practice, as discourse, 
which preserves life in the interest of life against life and against its worst 
tendencies and intentions. Politics is the savior of life. And it can save, pre-
serve and hence continue life’s life by performing an operation on that 
which in life is not—and maybe more, maybe less than—life: namely neg-
ativity. Politics operates on life by “immunizing,” this is Esposito’s term, 
life against itself, namely by negating the immanent negativity of life. 
Politics in this conception is that which safes life from its self­imposed 
destiny, it denaturalizes life by preserving it and protecting it even against 
its own self­destructive desires. Life necessitates, even needs, politics to 
remain what it is, since it was unable to go on without it. If life were not 
3  It is worth mentioning that Esposito believes that one can also find in Freud 
a positive, affirmative conception of life in the psychopathology of everyday life in 
which it is not the subject but what Esposito calls the “impersonal” that stands in the 
center of analysis. Cf. Esposito (2012b: 50ff., 2012c: 104–151).
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separated from itself, it would stop to be what it is, would stop to live and 
therefore to ensure the continuation of life one needs politics. This idea is 
what Esposito calls the immunization paradigm of political thought.
Life here is firstly understood as biological life and therefore one can 
say that the logos of bios is an auto­destructive one. This is why politics 
cannot but be a politics of life, or more precisely: biopolitics. All politics 
is biopolitics because it is life itself that necessitates politics and hence 
provides the very operational domain of and for it: The task of politics is 
to save life from itself4 and as all there practically is, is life, any persisting 
practice must be political, biopolitical. Everything is political is what can 
be derived from a biopolitical notion of politics. Politics kills the death in-
scribed into life, it destroys life’s self­destructive tendency. With the con-
ceptual emergence of politics, life as such is swallowed by politics or the 
political. With the emergence of politics, all life if it is alive is alive be-
cause there is politics. All (of) life is political, because it is politicized, that 
is to say: saved and separated from itself. Politics separates life from itself 
through negating its immanent negativity. Life in this conception needs 
politics to remain life, to be preserved, yet this preservation implies sepa-
ration and immunization, which is precisely the opposite of any idea of 
communion or community for Esposito.5 This is why the main problem of 
any biopolitical understanding of politics lies in accounting for how that 
which is separated with the emergence of politics can again come togeth-
er and form a community. Here one, obviously, cannot but think of Hobbes. 
In him as one of the modern thinkers of biopolitics in Esposito’s sense, 
one can clearly see how separation, immunization builds the basis for the 
constitution of any political community.
This means that separation (as the modus operandi of immunization, 
i.e., of politics) names the very paradoxical medium of politics (politics is 
separation) that is paradoxical because only through this separation it be-
comes possible to relate individual living bodies or species of living bodies 
to one other. One thus creates a community starting from what they as 
separated bodies have in common, what they share in terms of common 
attributes and one of the first things they share is obviously that they are 
separated. To take Hobbes as an example: All separated individuals share 
in Esposito’s reading the fear of death and hence they share precisely 
what cannot be shared and what thereby in his reading separates, namely 
anxiety. What makes them a community is precisely what separates them. 
Politics thus becomes the name of a discourse—a discourse of separa-
tion—that through separation relates bodies to one another. Politics of 
4  This even plays a role in what Esposito calls thanato­politics, where some 
forms of life are considered to be unworthy and hence it is not as if, say, the Nazis killed 
people (in the sense of taking lives), rather they protected life against destructive tenden-
cies within it. Thanatopolitics is thus a direct outcome of the biopolitical notion of life.
5  Cf. Esposito (2010).
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and as separation is the medium, and one could also say: the language 
that connects the bodies. In this account of the politics of biopolitics ev-
erything is political, because there is nothing but bodies and language, 
bodies and their medium of relation, namely separation. A politics of life 
that relates separated bodies, which are separated because there is poli-
tics and it relates them through a language of what the separated bodies 
have in common, namely separation. Everything is political since there is 
nothing but separated bodies and the language of politics. Everything is 
political since life can only be life as politicized, rescued, separated, and 
thereby self­related life.
Due to the immunizing and preserving tendency of politics with re-
gard to life, even washing one’s hands becomes in this sense a political act 
as it preserves our lives against the destructive, threatening impact of vi-
ruses and other destructive forms of life. Everything is political, because 
for the biopolitical account of politics what matters is life’s preservation 
and therefore all there is is bodies and languages.
This model of politics is the direct result of the idea that life cannot 
preserve itself: living bodies need the negating intervention of the dis-
course of politics to remain what they are, namely alive. Esposito argues 
that this model is the defining feature of modernity, namely that “only by 
negating itself can nature assert its own will to live. Preservation pro-
ceeds through the suspension or the alienation of that which needs to be 
protected. Therefore the political state cannot be seen as the continua-
tion or the reinforcement of nature, but rather as its negative converse” 
(Esposito 2006: 33). Politics, precisely by not being something that comes 
naturally, by not being given from the beginning, when it is finally gener-
ated against life’s paradoxical tendency to negate and seek to preserve 
itself at the same time, politics swallows all living things for the sake of 
preserving them. Politics as separation is a politics that keeps life alive 
and is therefore productive and self­sufficient. As Jean­Luc Nancy argued, 
this idea “thus amounts to asserting that ‘man’ is self­sufficient in the 
sense that he produces his own nature and, therein, nature as a whole. 
Until now, the vague representation of this self­sufficiency and this self­
production have entirely dominated the representations of politics…” 
(2002: 18). Man becomes self­sufficient as political preserver of his own 
life or more precisely: of life in general.
Esposito seeks to counter such a negative form of biopolitics—nega-
tive because it negates the negativity in life—with another, “an affirma-
tive biopolitics”, in which politics would not be “a power over life but a 
power of life” (Esposito 2012b: 60). He thus tries to split biopolitics into 
two. Seeking to separate precisely that which separates and from this fol-
lows: if one seeks to separate that which separates, one seeks also to re-
politicize politics, and if politics is that which is necessarily generated by 
the self­destructive tendency of life as something that denaturalizes nat-
ural life for the sake of keeping it alive, this also means to denaturalize that 
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which denaturalizes life and to… ultimately take it back to nature. This 
amounts to a strange identity of identity and difference, where in the end 
there is only pure affirmative life without any need for the former kind of 
politics. A life that would be (immediately identical to) politics, but this 
again means that everything (that lives) is political. In other words, de-
naturalizing what denaturalizes nature leads ultimately back to nature. If 
“everything is political” first seemed to be an apolitical claim because it 
only referred to the idea of preservation of life and did not imply any real 
idea of politics (this was the constitutive momentum of biopolitics), repo-
liticizing the negative notion of politics involved in biopolitics in my 
mind just directly leads to the same strange result, namely that one has to 
argue that life itself is political. But why should that be? Because if one 
politicizes politics and denaturalizes the process of denaturalization that 
is politics, one cannot but argue for life as such being political. But why is 
this problematic? Because in his account there is then no other form of 
politics than either mere administration of the given derivable from life 
(politics as negative biopolitics) or an affirmation of the naturality of na-
ture (the politicization of politics in biopolitics). So either politics is ad-
ministration or nature is political. “Everything is political” is a slogan that 
encapsulates this deadlock.
Is there thus no escape? Is everything political and hence not politi-
cal? If things seem to be messed up conceptually it always helps to turn to 
Hegel. I quote him: “The famous answer: ‘I do not see the need for it,’ 
given to the libeler who excused himself with the words: ‘But I have to 
live,’ is apposite at this point. Life ceases to be necessary in face of the 
higher realm of freedom” (Hegel 2008: 125). In a rather open reformula-
tion: What if life itself, life as such, is worth nothing? What if politics can-
not be derived from a notion of life? What if one first needs to separate 
the concepts of life and politics? Life as such then would be nothing that 
would, per se, be worth saving, politics would not be logically derivable 
from life’s constitution and the biopolitical notion of politics would rath-
er be some kind of defense mechanism against this very insight. For Hegel, 
if one just starts extrapolating from his brief passage, life as such is not 
necessary and—in the form of mere survival—has no value in itself. The 
only life that is worth of being lived is a free life, a life lived with and as 
unfolding of an idea, namely of the idea of freedom. With Hegel one can 
therefore argue that if the preservation of life as such is not necessary, 
not­everything is political. Politics is not at all derivable from life, from a 
concept of life, be it negative or positive. Maybe politics should rather be 
envisaged as that which is necessary for life to be life, but as something 
which at the same time cannot be inferred from life. Maybe one should 
claim politics to be one of the forms of action that is necessary for life to 
be a real life but also as something that from the perspective of life (and 
also from the perspective of politics derived from life) must seem impos-
sible. What if politics would be (a piece of) the real of life? This idea would 
16
Frank Ruda
neither imply deriving politics from life nor a return to a politics of life 
but a beginning of a real, of a different life through the very advent of 
politics that seems at the same time necessary and impossible from the 
perspective of life as such. In this sense one can argue that if life in the 
form of survival is meaningless and worth nothing, there is simply no real 
life before there is politics, and there simply is no politics before… before 
there is a break with the idea that there is any mere life worth living, 
worth returning to, worth whatever. There is, in short, no politics before 
there is politics. Politics is from this perspective something that plays a 
crucial part in any real life worth living, in any life with an idea.
There is no life without politics and politics is therefore one of the 
things that truly makes life into life. But this is ultimately to say that there 
is no life as such, it emerges first and foremost with politics. When one 
states everything is political, this claim itself obfuscates what one needs 
to speak about in the very manner it speaks about politics. Everything is 
political is linked to a peculiar fiction, namely that one could infer and 
derive politics from whatever given thing that is just there, that one can 
derive politics from what is, be it life in the broadest sense of the term, or 
economics, or whatever. With Hegel one can point out that true life is not 
simply given, or that the givenness of life as such is worth nothing. Fur-
thermore, one can infer that true life emerges only when something hap-
pens that cannot be derived from what is given, rather life only emerges 
when there is a rupture with the idea that anything is just given. Whoever 
thinks that everything is political does forget in advance any possibility of 
real politics as well as any possibility of real life. “Everything is political” 
is a slogan of those who naturalize politics (that itself is supposed to de-
naturalize life) and hence think that politics is a politics over life or of life. 
One thus needs to turn this idea around and assume that in fact: Nothing 
is, per se, political. Or even more precisely: There is nothing that can be 
political and hence politics seems to be impossible, and not always already 
potentially at work in life (for then in one Aristotelian way or the other 
this potential realizes itself). One must assume there will never be any 
true political action or organization ever (maybe ever again if one assumes 
that there once was politics). One thereby must assert the very outcome of 
the biopolitical notion of politics, even though it is rarely asserted by any-
one defending this very notion. Nothing can ever be political, it is impos-
sible that there ever will be politics and hence there will never be a life 
worthy of the name. So life itself has not value and politics will never ever 
emerge. Affirming the very impossibility of both and at the same time de-
claring their mutual necessary dependence marks one possible way of 
dealing with the deadlock pointed out. Yet, bored to death with specula-
tive twists like this, the new intelligentsia fled from the claims that things 
are much more lost than they like to assume, neither satisfied with pure 
theory (or endless conceptual dialectical elaborations that seem to be like 
dialectical porn) nor with direct concrete actions, and exiled itself to art 
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galleries and started proclaiming: Neither feel anxious nor trapped, even 
in the absence of politics proper, there is a savior, art can do the job.
All Art is Political
Today it seems heretical to doubt that art, all art, is political. To start 
with a paradigmatic example, I once had the rather unfortunate pleasure 
of witnessing a lecture on improvisation in jazz music whose most essen-
tial thesis can be resumed as follows: If one witnesses a jazz band impro-
vising, one witnesses how one has to conceive of true, that is democratic, 
political practice. Why? Because in jazz improvisation, everything de-
pends on the fact that everyone has to assert his or her individual voice, 
that the space for doing so is granted to him or her, he or she has to create 
with his instrument an individualized timbre and the level of individual 
improvisation is necessarily working together with the improvisation of 
the whole band such that all musicians pay attention and listen closely to 
one another. Thereby they constantly negotiate their cues, the dynamics 
of the collective as much as of each individual with one another. The im-
provisation of the jazz band was thereby declared to be the paradigm of 
democratic political action, because for the speaker any improvisation 
implied that one knows the rules of a game, has acquired the capacities 
not to improvise (i.e., to follow rules) and this means that one can only 
improvise due to individual appropriation, transgression, and modifica-
tion of those very rules that as such constitute the basis of a properly 
common activity. Jazz improvisation, this is what the speaker asserted, 
can therefore be taken as structural paradigm of true political practice 
since it manifests how real political practice, real participation, demo-
cratic negotiations are supposed to work. Jazz is thus democracy on a 
smaller scale. Why is this not simply nice and convincing? Is there any-
thing to say against this? There is indeed. This is due to certain facts that 
are so trivially true that they are easily forgotten quite frequently: Politics 
is not art and democracy is a form of organization that has a history, this 
is to say: It is not a value in itself. These are obviously trivial insights, yet 
one confuses one’s own gaze on such trivialities when one starts to be-
lieve that art is simply always political and, as the speaker did, simply as-
cribes to art the task of formulating a paradigm of politics.
One thereby loses track on the trivial insights, because one strangely 
starts to claim that art is a practice that can present the norm of all norma-
tive political practices, a model, so to speak, of how politics should be 
practiced. This is simply surprising, since politics is not jazz—and may one 
need to add: obviously? Strangely this is also because ultimately art would 
then be that which tells politics how to do politics, art would thus be a kind 
of politics without politics (proper). This leads to a peculiar definition of 
art. Peculiar because it implies a peculiar conceptual conflation: not only 
18
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is art then defined by an external measure, by an external practice, namely 
only via politics art can do what art is supposed to do. But at the same time 
art is thereby nothing but this other practice without, so to speak, the 
proper substance of this other practice, it is politics without politics. 
Thereby it is defined via an external practice but is at the same time sup-
posed to give this other practice a normative guideline and provide it with 
a model. Therefore one ends with a strange result: art provides guidelines 
for a practice from which it constitutively depends, because it is precisely 
defined by its relation to it, but is nonetheless supposed to be the norma-
tive standard according to which one is able to practice this other practice. 
Art is politics without politics, yet politics has to follow the model that art 
provides for political practice. Hence, politics should seek to become like 
art and therefore politics should ultimately also be a politics without poli-
tics. But if all politics is politics without politics, what then is politics? 
Such a convoluted relation between two not really defined kinds of prac-
tices leads to the strange effect that one ultimately cannot really deter-
mine anymore what art and politics are supposed to mean.
The speaker then tried to argue that this paradox can be resolved by 
contending that art is supposed to be a precondition for politics, because 
it can train us in attaining the correct political attitude. This is a claim that 
seems to be surprisingly fashionable today. Imagine you are not a demo-
crat, you see some jazz band improvise and as an effect of their perfor-
mance you understand that you were previously epistemologically con-
fused, and made, say, too substantialist assumptions about justice and 
truth. After seeing the jazz band perform you learn that democratic prac-
tice consists in negotiating solutions in a way that all voices are heard (at 
least all those voices would that are fit enough to play in the band). Yet this 
claim does not solve but it rather reiterates the problem of assuming that 
either art or politics are in some sense always already given, or in this case 
can be derived from one another. “All art is political” then allocates to art 
a similar function with regard to politics that the concept of life had in the 
claim that “everything is political.” Art comes to the rescue of politics, 
since as long as there is art, there will be politics (that once saved life’s 
life), because one can attain a paradigm of politics through artistic prac-
tices. Art thereby fulfills the role of a kind of political Ersatzbefriedigung, a 
substitute satisfaction, it is a sign that things are not as bad as long as one 
still can refer to political paradigms generated by art (and thereby every-
one is potentially politicized). Yet, I think with this displacement from the 
claim that everything is political to the idea that all art is political things 
get even worse. If art is supposed to reassure that there still is politics, 
only in the domain of art, this does not simply come with the danger of 
confusing one’s champagne drinking in a gallery with political action, but 
even worse, as the claim “all art is political” also obfuscates the insight 
into the problem even more drastically. It is like a displacing repetition of 
that which one does not like to or simply cannot remember: that there 
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simply may be no politics right now. The savior of politics is thereby part 
of the problem itself, which makes the problem worse, because thereby 
one does not only obscure the fact that there is a problem with the as-
sumed givenness of politics, one also obscures the fact that thereby one 
may also have a problem with regard to the alleged givenness of art.
Christoph Menke recently articulated the following diagnosis: “Never 
before in modernity there was more art, was art more visible and more 
determining within a society than today […] The ubiquitous presence of 
art […] in society goes hand in hand with a loss of what I propose to call 
its force…” (Menke 2013: 11). In a similar vein, Alain Badiou has argued 
that today there are two dominant paradigms, two norms of how to con-
ceive of subjectivity that both determine contemporary art production.6 
The first one is a materialist and monist one, namely that the subject is 
basically identical to its body, that there is no distinction between the 
two. Artistic practice following this paradigm implies a kind of experi-
ment with the limits of the body. And of course the ultimate limit of the 
body is death, so this implies an experiment with death that could be de-
scribed as extreme body art. Recall the example of the British woman who 
televised her own death and claimed it to be a work of art. So, if the sub-
ject is monistically identified with its body then art following this para-
digm is turned into an experiment of death in life, as an experiment with 
the limits of the body and hence of the subject. The second paradigm is a 
rather theological one that completely separates subject and body. It im-
plies that artistic creation is rather an experiment of life in death, of living 
beyond one’s body, transcending it and thereby finding a new life (one 
may here think of Lars von Trier’s Breaking the Waves where there is pre-
cisely the emergence of a true act of love when there is a complete separa-
tion of the body and the subject). Interestingly enough for Badiou it is not 
the power of life that builds the motor of these two paradigms but rather 
the power of death: of life in death or death in life.
These two paradigms of conceiving of subjectivity are obviously not 
only at work with regard to artistic but also political practices. The Ersatz-
befriedigung that one gets from art’s politicality is thus a very peculiar 
one, one that asserts the power of death, maybe a power that is related to 
the “death” of politics without acknowledging it. And against this back-
ground it may not come as a surprise that jazz improvisation was turned 
into a model of democratic practice, since at least in the Western world 
the so­called political framework in which “art” takes place is clearly con-
temporary democracy. And when Badiou claims that democracy at least in 
its contemporary guise represents the abolishment of politics, the ab-
sence of any real conception of politics (and hence of life) by turning poli­
tics into a gigantic operation of administrating of things, people, votes, 
6  See Badiou (2005).
20
Frank Ruda
etc., that thereby obscures the very idea there can be a political action 
that is not simply derived from what is taken to be a given, might one not 
assume that the art that presents a model of democratic practice in some 
way reinforces this kind of obscuration, this kind of foreclosure? “Art” 
seems to work as an Ersatzbefriedigung if one assumes that all art is po-
litical simply because it is a repeated denial of assuming what one in some 
sense already knows, namely that there is a lack of real politics, a lack of 
politics of the real. But could one not also assume that this functioning of 
art makes the very existence of art questionable if “art” is simply said to 
deliver a paradigm of democratic politics?
A Plea for A Philosophical Fatalism
I will end with a some manifesto­like propositions that I think one 
should assert to overcome the dilemma that is encapsulated by the ideas 
of everything being either political as such or of art as general placeholder 
for politics. These propositions are elements of what I call a philosophical 
fatalism.7 Such a fatalism neither implies a tragic dimension, such that one 
foresees how there always will be a necessary conflict between one’s hopes 
and wishes, desires and projects and the real and objective conditions, nor 
a existentialist dimension such that one would need to take the absurdity 
of the world into account and cannot escape doing all the Sisyphean re-
petitive work of becoming the bearer of some existential decision. The 
kind of philosophical fatalism I want to defend rather has a peculiar comic 
dimension, because: 1. It neither assumes that things will go wrong in the 
future but rather implies a different relation to the past; 2. It resembles 
the attitude the cartoon figures have that go on running even if they al-
ready surpassed the end of a cliff. So, here are my comic fatalist proposi-
tions of what to do with the deadlock that I see with regard to politics and 
art today. I think one should start from the assumptions that:
1. There will never be a life worthy of this name.
2. There will never be true political action.
3. There will never be any true art.
4. Art will never be political.
5. Politics is not art and art is not politics, although their distinc-
tion does not matter anyhow, since what they have in common is 
that they will remain both impossible.
6. Everything is already lost and it is necessarily impossible that 
this situation will ever change.
By affirming these propositions, by assuming that in some sense one 
is already dead, that one will never be truly alive, that the apocalypse has 
7  I extensively elaborated this conception in Ruda (2016).
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already happened,8 that only through the affirmation of the impossibility 
of life, politics, and art, one may generate the preconditions a new think-
ability (an impossible possibility) of life, politics, and art. Why? Because 
one thereby at least affirms that which stands at the ground of any true 
life and real politics and any true art: a necessary impossibility. Assuming 
them and thereby affirming points of impossibility—that is also a way of 
reading the true emancipatory potential of Hegel’s idea of the end of art 
and history—one does not simply give up, but rather one assumes the 
impossible and yet necessary position with which nearly ends, un­ends 
not a great cartoon but a great novel. In Beckett’s Unnamable (2009: 408), 
one reads: “I see nothing. It’s because there is nothing. Or it’s because 
I have no eyes. Or both. (That makes three possibilities to choose from).” 
I think one should opt for the third: we do not have eyes and there is noth-
ing. But this seems to be a better option than to constantly see what is not 
there with eyes that one hallucinates. There was a great apocalypse under 
heaven, the situation is excellent.
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